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Introduction
Taiwan’s legislative and presidential elections inJanuary and March 2008 marked a turning pointin the country’s political development. With the
accession of Ma Ying-jeou to the presidency of the
Republic of China (the official name for Taiwan), the
Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) has
recaptured executive power after eight years of adminis-
tration by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Backed by its increased majority in Parliament, the KMT
now has full power to implement its programme. Looking
beyond results, these elections also mark a resounding
success for Taiwanese democracy and its consolidation.
Unlike 2004, when defeated KMT candidates chal-
lenged the results with street demonstrations and legal
manoeuvres even though the organisation of the polling
had been exemplary, this year’s presidential election took
place without incident, and the result was immediately
accepted by the DPP. The KMT’s victory brings a sec-
ond switch of power in eight years, and confirms the bed-
ding down of democratic institutions and practices on the
island. In this article, we will look back at the legislative
elections before analysing in detail the results of the pres-
idential poll and the lessons to be drawn from it. Finally,
we will examine the challenges that the new president
confronts over the economy, relations with China, and
national identity. (1)
Legis lative  e lect ions
Analysis  of  the r esul ts
The elections for the new Taiwanese parliament, the
Legislative Yuan (LY), were held on 12 January 2008. The
poll presented some new developments compared with ear-
lier elections. Only 113 seats were at stake, the number
halved since the last election, and legislators faced a term of
four years as against three previously. The voting system was
also changed, the multi-member constituency system (2) hav-
ing been abandoned in favour of a “single-member district,
two vote” system. Seventy-three deputies were directly elect-
ed in single-member constituencies, while a separate vote
distributed 34 seats proportionally to political party lists, and
six seats were reserved for Taiwan’s aboriginal minority. At
the same time, two referendums were held, one over the
assets of the KMT (tabled by the DPP) and the other call-
ing for action against corruption (tabled by the KMT).
The results gave a substantial victory to the KMT, which for
the constituency vote brought under its name the whole of
the Pan-Blue coalition (made up of the KMT, the People
First Party – PFP — and the Chinese New Party — NP).
Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma
Ying-jeou’s Victory and the
KMT’s Return to Power
FRANK MUYARD
1. I would like to thank Mr. Hu Chih-chiang for its help in the research for this article.
2. On the legislative elections of 2004, cf. Frank Muyard, “KMT: A Trompe-l’oeil
Victory: The December 2004 Taiwanese Legislative Elections,” China Perspectives,
n°58, March-April 2005, p. 43-54.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
After eight years of DPP administration, the 2008 legislative and presidential polls in Taiwan saw the Kuomintang
return to power with the election of Ma Ying-jeou as the new president and an increased majority in the Parliament.
Apart from the circumstantial factors behind this double victory, a detailed analysis of the poll results and
comparisons with the results of previous elections reveals the recent evolution of an electorate that remains
structurally oriented towards the KMT.
With 53.5 percent of the votes, the KMT and the PFP
won 81 seats out of 113, exceeding two thirds of the new
parliament. With the additional support of four independ-
ent representatives, the Pan-Blue camp now controls up
to three quarters of the LY, which gives it control over the
country’s legislation unequalled since the early 1990s.
The DPP, on the other hand, suffered its worst defeat in
20 years, returning only 27 seats despite a relatively
strong total of 38.17 percent of the votes. 
The KMT’s LY victory was expected. By itself or with its
allies in the Pan-Blue camp, the KMT has actually won
every legislative election in Taiwan since the country was
democratised. Its long domination of Taiwan and its
bedrock support within local politics, including a good
voting network ensured by control of numerous local fac-
tions and associations, give it a definite electoral advan-
tage. Opinion polls before the election had also predict-
ed a KMT victory. Yet, the scale of the party’s success
came as a surprise, especially in terms of seats. Further
analysis provides several explanations for this. 
First, there were technical reasons. Because of the reduc-
tion in the number of representatives, and in order to
guarantee that the Legislative Yuan included representa-
tives from each county (xian) and municipality, the rules
on equal political representation (prescribing one repre-
sentative for every 300,000 electors approximately) were
stretched a little to give one seat each to the less populat-
ed counties in East Taiwan (Hualien, Taitung) and the
islands in the Strait of Formosa (Kinmen, Matsu,
Penghu). The six seats reserved for aboriginal candidates
also far exceed their demographic weight (the aborigines
are 2 percent of the population). The traditional Pan-
Blue inclinations of all these constituencies required the
DPP to win decisively in the rest of the country, an
unlikely prospect given the general structure of the elec-
torate and the local predispositions in Taiwanese elec-
tions. The DPP itself only hoped to win at best 30 to 35
of the disputed constituencies by majority vote, an insuf-
ficient result to secure a majority in parliament. (3) Finally,
the system of first-past-the-post tends to exaggerate the
results in terms of seats; in a sense, it offers additional
rewards to the winners.
But while the new voting system considerably widened
the gap in terms of seats, it cannot be blamed for the
DPP’s defeat. That was caused first and foremost by
changes in the numbers of votes won by the competing
camps. It would be deceptive to take into account only
the DPP’s and the KMT’s results. In the constituency
vote, the KMT achieved an increase of 20.7 percent
compared with 2004, when it was competing with the
PFP and the NP for the same electorate. The DPP on
its side saw its share of the electorate grow by 2.5 per-
cent, a result that has to be considered positive. In terms
of the two camps, on the other hand, the Pan-Blue vote
increased by 6.9 percent, while that of the Pan-Greens
(that is, the DPP and the Taiwanese Solidarity Union,
TSU) fell by 4.4 percent. Furthermore, while the gap
between the camps favoured the Pan-Blues by only 3.3
percent in 2004, it jumped to 14.7 percent this time. The
DPP made progress, but it did so essentially at the
expense of the TSU, whose votes fell by 6.8 percent.
The gap between the two camps was reflected in the
results of the voting on party lists. The slight fall in the
KMT vote was made up by the NP’s votes (3.95 per-
cent), bringing the Pan-Blues an overall total of 55.2 per-
cent. The TSU’s 3.5 percent added to the DPP’s 37 per-
cent pushed the Pan-Green camp past the 40 percent
mark. With less than 5 percent of the votes, however, nei-
ther the NP nor the TSU – or any other small party –
will be represented in the new Parliament.
The Pan-Blue camp not only won a clear victory in per-
centage terms, both in comparison with the Pan-Greens
and with the independents (whose total fell by 2.54 per-
cent), it also increased its tally by more than 760,000
additional votes. This advance marks a turning point in
recent political history by reversing the continuing decline
the Pan-Blues had been suffering since 1995. Their suc-
cess in the legislative elections of 2004 had actually been
somewhat deceptive: while the Pan-Blue camp kept its
parliamentary majority, it lost 2.89 percent of its support
and more than 580,000 individual votes – historically, its
worst-ever performance. This time, by contrast, it
regained voting levels equal to its success in the legisla-
tive elections of 1998, which preceded the rise to power
of Chen Shui-bian and the DPP. Conversely, the Pan-
Green camp has lost more than 350,000 votes in four
years, and 370,000 votes compared with the elections in
2001. 
A detailed analysis of the turnout also gives us a more
qualified picture of the abstention rate. In percentage
terms, the turnout dropped once again to a record low of
3. Assuming the balance of power obtaining in 2004, the Pan-Greens would have been able
to win 31 seats out of 73 as well as 15 to 16 seats from their party lists by the propor-
tional vote. The calculation was made by the author based on statistics provided in Liang
Shih-wu et al., 21 shiji Taiwan toupiao jilu, Taipei, Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 2007.
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58.5 percent, as against 59.16 percent in 2004.
However, in absolute terms, the number of votes cast was
quite high, up by more than 250,000 votes, indicating
effective mobilisation, at least on the winning side. It
actually equalled the voting tally of the 1998 LY elec-
tions. In fact, ever since 1995, around 9.5 to 10.5 million
electors have been voting in the legislative elections.
While the turnout has been falling steadily for ten years,
from 68.1 percent down to 58.5 percent, this is because
the continuing growth in the overall electorate automati-
cally pushes down the percentage of voters. It is thus pos-
sible that mostly the same electors turn out to vote on
each occasion — politically conscious and mainly commit-
ted people. At the same time, there is clearly an increase
in the number of uncommitted, non-politicised voters, and
of people disillusioned with politics who do not vote in
1. Results of Taiwanese Legislative Elections (1995-2008)
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the LY elections. That is particularly the case with many
young people. (4)
An assessment of the results of the legislative elections since
1995 shows, in addition, that support for the Pan-Blue camp
wavers between a minimum of 4.5 million and 46.8 percent
of the votes (2004) and a maximum of 5.5 million votes
(1995); results in 1998 and 2008 were fairly similar: 5.3
million and 53-55 percent of the votes. Thus, with the
exception of 2004, the Pan-Blue camp has always won more
than 5 million votes, which seems to be its average electoral
base in parliamentary polling. On the Pan-Green side, the
highest number of votes was achieved in 2001 and again in
2004 with 4.2 million; the best percentage was 43.5 percent
in 2004; and the worst result was in 1998, with 2.9 million
and 29.6 percent of the votes. (5) The 3.8 million votes that
it won in 2008 (40.4 percent) may be considered its new
electoral base after eight years in power. It represents a real
improvement compared with the 1990s, and reflects the
overall increase in support for the Pan-Greens, from 30-33
percent during the 1990s to 40-43 percent during the
2000s. The fluctuating performance of both camps in leg-
islative elections can therefore be explained by the their abil-
ity to mobilise their own supporters while attracting a pro-
portion of the undecided. In any case, assuming the Pan-
Blues’ regular potential to be higher than that of the Pan-
Greens, barring exceptional circumstances, a victory for the
Pan-Greens in parliamentary elections would remain diffi-
cult to achieve in the near future, especially in the context of
the new electoral system.
Causes  and consequences of  the  KMT’s win 
The first reasons behind the KMT's victory are its closer
union with its allies and its greater mastery of the new vot-
ing system. After 15 years of division within the Pan-Blue
camp, the KMT has at last succeeded in creating a solid
electoral alliance with its partners, the PFP and the NP,
thanks to a nominating process that gave the parties ade-
quate representation and avoided any new fratricidal battles:
20 deputies – 25 percent -- of the 80 candidates elected
under the KMT banner are former PFP or NP members,
to whom is added one PFP aboriginal candidate. This union
was the condition for victory in a majority single-ballot elec-
toral system, in which a divided camp usually turns out to be
the poll's loser. The KMT was also able to field candidates
with good local connections, and as always, it based its cam-
paign on the local needs and concerns -- particularly the eco-
nomic concerns -- of the population.
The Pan-Greens, by contrast, have flaunted their divisions.
The disagreements between the DPP and the TSU prevent-
ed an effective electoral alliance and demobilised a propor-
tion of their electorate. In addition there were rifts within
the DPP, illustrated by a stormy nomination process that
ultimately benefited the party’s more radical wing. At least
three safe Pan-Green seats in the south were thus lost
because of a dissident TSU or DPP candidate. With a vot-
ing system requiring parties to raise the greatest number of
votes, rather than merely gathering grass roots support as
with the old system, the party’s rejection of its own centrist
candidates was clearly counter-productive in terms of both
the party’s image and the appeal of its candidates. In the
end, the DPP lost all 11 of its marginal constituencies, as
well as four constituencies it previously thought safe -- this on
top of the three lost through dissident activity. By compari-
son, the Pan-Blues held every one of the constituencies
where they had majorities in 2004.
At bottom, the KMT’s success is linked to two main causes:
Firstly, the dissatisfaction of the Pan-Green and centrist
electorate with the government and with President Chen
Shui-bian, and secondly, the desire to see the KMT back in
government, mainly because of its reputation for economic
competence. Despite good economic indicators (5.7 percent
growth and 3.9 percent unemployment in 2007), the stagna-
tion and even reduction in the purchasing power of a propor-
tion of the middle and poorer classes, as well as the contin-
uing delocalisation of Taiwanese enterprises into China,
have given people a sense of economic crisis. Such fears
were intensified last year in the context of rising world ener-
gy and food prices and costlier housing. 
Lastly, the DPP is paying for the tarnishing of its image as
a clean party in the wake of a series of corruption scandals
that have implicated associates of the President and the gov-
ernment since mid-2005. Corruption has always been a
major concern among Taiwanese people in their electoral
choices. In a campaign whose few national themes have
focused -- as in previous elections -- on national identity (a
DPP strength) and on the economy and governmental com-
petence (KMT strengths), the Pan-Blues succeeded in
reversing previous perceptions of their own corruption, and
turned the anti-corruption theme against the DPP. In this
4. One explanation is the persistent habit of registering at the electoral office near the fam-
ily home, and not the one near the individual’s home. Thus, a large number of students
and young workers originating from the centre and the south but living in the north are
unwilling or unable to return to their parents’ home for the legislative elections. By con-
trast, when it comes to the presidential elections, they do generally make the trip.
5. 1998 witnessed a very high percentage of votes going to independent candidates.
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context, the record abstentions also reflect the desire of Pan-
Green and centrist voters to teach the DPP a lesson. 
Among its supporters, the DPP also finds itself reproached,
on the one hand, with not having sufficiently advanced the
pro-independence programme, and with having failed to
recover the unwarranted assets of the KMT or to change the
system of local pro-KMT factions; and on the other hand for
having failed to undertake the progressive reforms it prom-
ised in the political, social, and environmental fields. (6)
Some of these failures are due to opposition by the Pan-
Blue-controlled parliament, which since 2001 has practised
political sabotage aimed at blocking DPP policy; (7) even so,
the government has ultimately been held responsible
because of its own mistakes and its perceived lack of admin-
istrative and economic competence.
The combined effect of the new voting system and the
January results has had noteworthy consequences for the
parliament. Firstly, the control of three quarters of the seats
by the KMT and its allies has given them complete legisla-
tive freedom. The system enabling parliamentary commit-
tees to check and approve bills before the chamber votes on
them can only delay their eventual enactment. The Pan-Blue
camp will also be able to unilaterally launch the process for
revising the constitution (though subject to popular approval
in a referendum). A new political landscape defined by two-
party politics – or even by single-party politics, given the
DPP’s great weakness in parliament – could, in turn, lead to
a revival of KMT factions and conflicts of interest, compli-
cating the future Pan-Blue government’s business. The
reduction in the number of constituencies also favours the
rise of individual power among deputies, their collusion with
local and national lobbies, and the creation of personalised
political machines to ensure their re-election. Because of the
ever-increasing cost of electoral campaigns in Taiwan, incum-
bent representatives will thus enjoy a strong advantage in
2012, while the parties’ control over their own deputies is
likely to decline. Yet, the large number of voters with no
political affiliations raises other possibilities. The DPP
might make a comeback by basing its message on the voters’
needs; alternatively, a third party might emerge, profiting
either from possible socioeconomic problems that transcend
the present political polarisation, or from new divisions with-
in the KMT.
As for the two referendums proposed to voters on 12
January, the KMT boycott prevented the required 50 per-
cent participation in both cases. (8) This failure proved once
again that referendums cannot work in Taiwan unless both
camps agree on the question in advance; and it portended a
similar outcome for the more controversial referendum pro-
posed during the presidential election, on whether Taiwan
should join or return to the UN.President ia l  el ect ions
Analysis  of  the r esul ts
The fourth presidential election by direct universal suffrage
in Taiwanese history was held on 22 March this year. On
the DPP ticket were Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, former
Mayor of Kaohsiung (1998-2005) and Prime Minister
(2005-2006), and his running-mate Su Tseng-chang, former
Governor of the county of Taipei (1997-2004) and Prime
Minister (2006-2007). Opposing them on the KMT ticket
were Ma Ying-jeou, former Mayor of Taipei (1998-2006),
and Vincent Siew Wan-chang, Prime Minister during the
presidency of Lee Teng-hui (1997-2000).
The shock inflicted on the DPP by its failure in the elec-
tions to parliament allowed some to expect a pendulum
effect to operate in the presidential elections to counterbal-
ance the KMT’s excessive power in the chamber. Yet, that
would require the DPP to recover undecided voters along
with its own moderate electors who had abandoned it in
January. The DPP would also need to confront the voters’
desire for an end to the standoff in power between the exec-
utive and the parliament that a KMT presidency would
bring. In any case, only a very high turnout, above 80 per-
cent, could have produced an outcome that favoured the
Pan-Greens, faced as they were with a Pan-Blue camp
whose structural and tactical advantage was doubled by
offering one of the most popular and media-friendly candi-
dates in Taiwan’s democratic history. The challenge for
Hsieh was to adequately distance himself from Chen Shui-
bian and his administration while at the same time project-
ing himself as the best guarantor of Taiwanese identity and
socioeconomic recovery, and unifying a Pan-Green camp
divided between factions, tactics, and opposing strategies.
6. Cindy Sui, “Taiwan’s Defeated Party Rebuilds,” Asia Times Online,  22 April 2008.
7. Cf. Shelley Rigger, “The Unfinished Business of Taiwan’s Democratization”, in Nancy
Bernkopf Tucker, Dangerous Straits. The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, New York, Columbia
University Press, 2005, pp.16-43.
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In the end, the election finished with an outright victory for
Ma, with 58.45 percent of the vote (7.6 million) as against
41.55 percent (5.4 million) for his opponents. While the win
for Ma and Siew was both expected and forecast, its extent
did surprise most pundits, as well as the politicians of both
the DPP and the KMT. Admittedly, opinion polls had indi-
cated a gap quite close to the eventual 17 percent; but the
repeated underestimate of Pan-Green votes by public opinion
polls before previous elections, as well as the parties’ gener-
ally more reliable private polling, had suggested a less easy
victory. (9) In any event, the Taiwanese made a clear choice in
favour of Ma and the KMT, with their programme for closer
economic interaction with China and for maintaining the
political status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This confirmation of
the January vote challenged the widespread notion that leg-
islative elections and presidential elections obey different
logic. In fact, the same causes produced the same effects: vot-
ers expressed both their rejection of President Chen Shui-
bian’s DPP government and their wish to give KMT leaders
the means to implement their policies.
Concurrently with the presidential vote, two important refer-
endums for Taiwan’s international relations were held. The
first, tabled by the DPP, appealed for the country to join the
UN under the name of Taiwan. The second, tabled by the
KMT, proposed that Taiwan should return to the UN under
the name of the Republic of China (ROC) or any other
acceptable name. While the DPP called for yes votes in
both referendums to ensure that at least one should succeed,
the KMT decided to actively boycott the DPP proposal and
mildly support its own without calling on supporters to vote.
Contrary to the expectations of some and the fears of oth-
ers, notably in Beijing and Washington, the referendums did
not play a central role either in the campaign or in the final
result of the presidential vote. With a mere 36% turnout for
each of  them, both were invalided. 
The KMT and its Pan-Blue voters preferred to ignore the
strategic value of the referendums for future negotiations
with China as well as their value in the expression of iden-
tity, because of their potential to provoke, because the US
had openly opposed holding them, and because they felt the
referendums were politically manipulated towards partisan
ends. Still more than 6 million electors took part in both ref-
erendums. As in the January referendums, this was more
than had voted for the DPP in the election.
If we compare the 2008 results with those in earlier presi-
dential elections, we can identify some of the reasons for
Ma’s victory. To do that, we must compare the strength of
the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green camps rather than the individ-
ual candidates: this is because of the divisions within the
Pan-Blue camp since the start of the 1990s 
Compared with 2004, when Chen and Lu Hsiu-lien won by
only a whisker over Lien and Soong, one may note that the
votes for the Pan-Blue candidate rose by more than 1.2 mil-
lion, while those for the Pan-Green candidate dropped by a
million. In effect, a million votes were transferred from the
Pan-Greens to the Pan-Blues. In terms of geographic share,
Ma dominated almost the whole country, including the sym-
bolically important municipalities of the south, Chiayi,
Tainan, and Kaohsiung; only five counties in the centre and
the south (Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and
Pingtung) showed a slight majority for Hsieh. In 2004,
Chen won all the counties and cities of the south with very
large majorities, as well as the key counties of Changhua,
Nantou, Taichung, and Ilan; this enabled him to counterbal-
ance the traditional Pan-Blue majorities in the north and
north-west. (10)
The turnout, at 76.33 percent, was down by four points.
That may be explained partly by the fact that the results
were largely predictable compared with previous presidential
elections, but partly also because the polarisation of politics
had caused a growing proportion of the electorate to lose
interest. Yet, reflecting the growth of the registered elec-
torate (+ 814,443), the number that actually voted was
roughly equal to that in 2004, down by only 30,000 votes.
While the election attracted proportionately fewer voters,
the number of electors remained steady at 13.2 million, indi-
cating very strong mobilisation of Pan-Blue and Ma support-
ers, as well as rank-and-file Pan-Greens.
Looking back to 2000, the picture is slightly different. Chen
and Lu had won their first mandate thanks to the Pan-Blue
camp’s division between three candidates. (11) If the support
behind the Pan-Blue candidates in 2000 is added together,
the result is close to the recent total: 7.6 million and 60.2
percent of the vote for the Pan-Blues, as against nearly five
8. Results of referendum n° 3 (on the return of KMT assets alleged to be illegitimate):
Turnout 26.34%, 4,550,881 voters. Yes: 91.46%, 3,891,170 votes. No: 8.54%, 363,494
votes. Results of referendum n° 4 (for a public enquiry into corruption in government):
Turnout 26.08%, 4,505,927 votes. Yes: 58.17%, 2,304,136. No: 41,83%, 1,656,890.
9. Cf. Alan Romberg, “Taiwan Elections. Foundation for the Future,” China Leadership
Monitor, n° 24, spring 2008, p. 23, note 49; David Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New
Course,” Comparative Connections, April 2008, p. 3.
10. On the presidential election of 2004, cf. Frank Muyard, “Taiwan. The Birth of a Nation?”,
China Perspectives, n°53, May-June 2004, p. 33-48.
11. Lien Chan and Vincent Siew Wan-chang (for the KMT), Soong Chu-yu and Chang Chao-
hsiung, and Lee Ao and Feng Yu-hsiang. There was also the independent candidacy of
Hsu Hsin-liang and Chu Hui-liang with a strong Hakka colouring. Cf. Joseph Wu Jausieh,
“After the Watershed, the Uncertainties: Assessing the Results of Taiwan’s Presidential
Election,” China Perspectives, n°29, May - June 2000, p. 25-35. 
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2. Results of the Presidential Elections in Taiwan (1996-2008)
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million and 39.3 percent of the vote for Chen and Lu. The
similarity is repeated in the municipal and county results
since 2000, from which one can see that only the county of
Tainan gave a majority to the DPP candidates in 2000.
All the other counties and municipalities in the south and
centre were Pan-Blue, which helps us better understand the
extent of Ma’s success in the south. Here again, Ma is main-
ly picking up the Pan-Blue electorate of 2000. While the
drop in Pan-Green numbers is very obvious compared with
2004, their result this year was still better than in 2000, win-
ning five counties instead of one and an increased vote
everywhere save Taipei.
Just as the parliamentary poll this year saw the KMT recov-
er its support of 1998, the presidential election in March
seems to present a return to the situation of 2000 in terms
of the balance of power between Pan-Blues and Pan-
Greens, with a slight improvement of 2.25 percent for the
Pan-Greens. Moving on to the turnout, it was 82.69 per-
cent in 2000, 6 percentiles higher than this year. But tak-
ing into account the increased number of registered voters
(+ 1,858,997), many more people actually voted this year
(+ 434,938). Now, in terms of votes, we can see that
among these 434,000 new voters Ma picked up only 50,000
more than the divided Pan-Blues in 2000, whereas Hsieh
won 467,000, a higher total than the increase in voters. If we
examine the 1996 election, we observe similar tendencies.
With three million extra registered voters and 2.3 million
extra votes in 2008, the Pan-Blues have lost 830,000 votes
while the Pan-Greens have gained more than 3.1 million.
These figures clearly illustrate the historic rise of the Pan-
Greens, of Taiwanese nationalism, and indeed of Taiwanese
pro-independence support since the first presidential elec-
tion by universal suffrage in Taiwan.
But this analysis also confirms what we learned from the leg-
islative elections: that the grassroots potential of the Pan-
Blues has always been greater than that of the Pan-Greens.
Over the past three presidential elections since 2000, the
lowest vote for the Pan-Blues was 6.44 million in 2004, while
the best was 7.65 million in 2000 and 2008. Turning to the
Pan-Greens, however, their 6.47 million votes in 2004 was
their peak performance, while the 5.45 million scored in
2008 probably represents their new electoral base. This illus-
trates, on the one hand, the exceptional nature of Chen’s win
in 2004, and on the other, the decoupling of Taiwanese
national identity, still growing, from electoral preferences.
Before analysing the reasons behind Ma’s victory, one must
then explain the DPP’s achievement in 2004. In that elec-
tion, Chen Shui-bian profited from several factors favouring
his re-election. Firstly, being the outgoing incumbent
enabled him to attract the votes of independent or moderate
local leaders by offering government support for their local
development plans. In practice, the 11 percent boost in
Chen’s vote was also at least half due to the support he
received from the TSU and Lee Teng-hui, who controlled
part of the old KMT’s pro-Taiwan local networks, particular-
ly in the centre and the south -- which by 2008 were tend-
ing to veer towards Ma. But Chen was also able to attract
personal support by virtue of his charisma and his capacity
for unifying the Pan-Green camp. People also wanted to
give a new mandate to the DPP, another chance to show
what it could do. Lastly, Chen and Lu were the spokesper-
sons for Taiwanese identity and for the democratic and pro-
gressive movement of the previous 20 years, as opposed to
Lien and Soong, who spoke for Chinese identity and were
symbols of the KMT old guard. In fact, given the very slight
margin of Chen’s victory, if Ma had been the Pan-Blues’
candidate at that time, there is little doubt that he would
already have been elected in 2004. 
A key role is thus played by the electors of the middle.
Contrary to the conclusions reached by many DPP strate-
gists since 2004, the variation in the votes achieved by DPP
candidates in the last three elections (2000: 39.3 percent,
2004: 50.1 percent, 2008: 41.5 percent) proves the existence
and importance of these floating voters, amounting to at least
a 15-20 percent share of the electorate. While the Taiwanese
electorate gives a structural majority to the Pan-Blues, the lat-
ter can in fact only obtain an absolute majority by bringing in
centrist voters, as Lien’s defeat in 2004 showed. Now, many
of these unpoliticised electors are also in the geographical
centre of the island – that is, in the counties of Taichung,
Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin – and they tend to offer their
support to the incumbent candidate or to a probable winner.
Another floating sub-group is that of new electors, mainly
young people, who on the whole are less politicised and com-
mitted than their predecessors. Their votes are dictated more
by present conditions, and they are sensitive to what is new,
and to promises that their future will be improved.
Causes of  Ma’s  vic tory,  and  lessons  to bedrawn
Yet, the structural predominance of the KMT in the
Taiwanese electorate does not by itself explain Ma’s victory or
its extent. The Pan-Blue camp had also to fulfil a number of
conditions to insure that it would not repeat its 2004 failure:
fist, creating internal unit; second, choosing a charismatic can-
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didate who could embody the electorate’s desire for change
and progress; and lastly, adopting an electoral programme and
a message that took into account voters’ wishes and the socio-
political development of recent decades in terms of democra-
tisation and Taiwanisation, and at the same time that might
take advantage of disappointment with the DPP.
As in January, the main reasons for the KMT’s win in
March were thus voters’ rejection of Chen and the DPP
government, and the desire for a change of team after two
terms under the Pan-Greens. To that was added, as in
January, the wish for a unified cabinet and parliament after
eight years of divided rule and political stalemate. The elec-
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torate was expressing its weariness with the constant ten-
sions that marked the Chen Shui-bian era, both at home
with the increase in partisan radicalisation, and abroad with
rising tensions with China and disagreements with the US.
A need for calm and stability, the electors’ wish not to have
political questions constantly distracting them from their own
affairs, the hope of taking greater advantage of China’s
growth while maintaining the political status quo: these ele-
ments all played a definite role in bringing the KMT back
to power. 
But Ma’s victory was also his own: that of a charismatic fig-
ure, a democrat, with a reputation for personal integrity. The
sheer extent of his success gives him a special mandate that
exceeds support for the KMT or its policies. And it was
Hsieh’s defeat. While the DPP’s candidate had little
chance given the general unpopularity of the Pan-Greens,
Hsieh failed to attract more voter support for his reputation
or his personality. His personal image – a competent admin-
istrator but cunning politician with a sometimes unsavoury
entourage – could not match Ma’s charisma and media
skills. And, unlike Chen in 2004, Hsieh was unable to unify
the Party and the Pan-Greens around his leadership. (12)
Admittedly, his campaign was effective, at the media level
especially, and he put Ma in serious difficulty over his pro-
gramme for economic rapprochement with China, forcing
him to moderate it or spell it out, and over his personal
integrity and leadership capacity. (13) Even so, Hsieh did not
campaign enough in person, travelling very little, and did not
achieve the personal contact that is fundamental to
Taiwanese politics, whereas Ma had toured the country
since autumn, with “long stays” in the counties of the south
and centre. So while Hsieh’s campaign did rally the grass-
roots of the Pan-Green camp, it did not convince centrist vot-
ers or stimulate a higher turnout.
On political programmes, some rapprochements were
noticed in the course of the campaign. (14) However the two
candidates did express differing views, mainly in a series of
televised debates and numerous adverts on the following
points: (15) First, how quickly and how much should econom-
ic relations with China be strengthened in light of potential
risks, strategic exposure, and economic dependence?
Second, which economic and social policies should be
developed to maintain Taiwanese prosperity in the areas of
tax, sustainable development, and professional training?
Third, what priority should be given to asserting Taiwan’s
national identity? Lastly, the candidates debated their own
personal qualities. Now, while the repositioning of Hsieh’s
economic programme on relations with China did not con-
vince either the radical Pan-Greens, who are opposed, or
the centrists who prefer the KMT’s original version, Ma’s
strategy of following the voters’ lead on Taiwanese identity
and democratic values did strike the right note.
Indeed, one of the most important aspects of this vote is that
Ma Ying-jeou’s victory is based on some fundamental assur-
ances he has given in relation to Taiwan. From the start he
declared loud and clear his Taiwanese identity (“I am
Taiwanese”), and asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty and its inde-
pendence as the ROC. (16) He also committed himself to
defending that sovereignty, and pledged that Taiwan’s future
could be decided only by Taiwan’s 23 million citizens. Then
Ma reaffirmed his attachment to the status quo with China,
promising not to pursue unification in the short or medium
term (that is, 30 to 50 years) and not to embark on any
negotiations on the subject during his term of office. Lastly,
he took a firm stand on democracy as the central value of
Taiwanese society, setting China’s democratisation as the
precondition for any future unification. In fact, this position
looks back to the conditions of Lee Teng-hui’s Reunification
Programme of 1991, but imposes far more precise barriers
to unification than the positions taken on the question by
Lien or Soong.
Ma also campaigned on the return to “real Taiwanese val-
ues,” betrayed, he said, by the DPP. Backed by TV adverts
stressing the links between the KMT and Taiwan – some of
them in the Taiwanese language – and supported with a new
Taiwanisation of the KMT’s discourse, Ma and the KMT
managed to sever the assumed connection between the DPP
and the defence of Taiwanese interests and identity. Lastly,
Ma was better able to express the openness to the outside
world of the new Taiwanese society created by democracy
with his campaign founded on the fresh opportunities of the
future. By contrast, the DPP, unlike in the 1990s when it was
swept along by the waves of democratisation and
Taiwanisation and by the relative youthfulness of its leaders,
has been appearing too involved with the past, with
Taiwanese heritage, and nostalgia for a passing identity of
12. Cf. Cindy Sui, “Taiwan’s Defeated Party Rebuilds,” op. cit.
13. On the two candidates’ campaigns, cf. the detailed assessment of Alan Romberg,
“Taiwan Elections. Foundation for the Future,” op. cit.
14. On the candidates’ programmes, cf. “Presidential Election 2008. Profiles of Presidential
Candidates,” Taipei Times, 21 March 2008, as well as the campaign websites
www.ma19.net and http://vivataiwan.tv.
15. Cf. the transcription of the main TV debate on 9 March, “Hsieh and Ma Face the Nation,”
and “Presidential Hopefuls Spar on Critical Issues,” Taipei Times, 10 March 2008. For
Ma’s TV adverts, cf. http://www.ma19.net/video/ads; for those of Hsieh,
http://vivataiwan.tv/index.php?sid=573&page=1.
16. Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Defend Taiwan’s Sovereignty, Says Ma,” Taipei
Times, 15 March 2008.
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former times. (17) Paradoxically, the DPP of today missed the
crystallisation of the new Taiwanese identity that it had done
so much to create. Now that everyone is a democrat and
everyone Taiwanese, even the KMT, it is no longer so nec-
essary to fight for democracy and Taiwanese identity. It is
time to look ahead, to seek what is new: this includes China,
with its risks and opportunities, and the rest of the world.The  v iew ahead:  Threechal lenges  for  Ma
As the new Taiwanese President, Ma Ying-jeou has great
expectations to fulfil, notably insuring more peaceful cross-
Strait relations and greater prosperity at home. Yet, in both
cases, many of the answers depend not on him but on the
world economy and the attitude of Beijing. At the national
level, Ma must quickly keep his promises and respect his
commitments to Taiwan’s voters. Having centred his elec-
toral campaign on reviving the economy, he will have only a
short honeymoon period in which to prove his competence.
Also, he must improve relations with Washington, Taipei’s
indispensable backer. The US is already well disposed
towards Ma because of his support for the status quo; but
Washington will also have to show that it can help Taiwan
at the international level, and will have complex choices to
make in balancing its relations with Taiwan on the one hand,
and China on the other, particularly in the areas of defence
procurement and contacts and the free trade agreement that
Taipei is seeking. Lastly, in his relationship with Beijing, Ma
will have to exercise extreme caution so as not to appear to
betray Taiwan’s interests and sovereignty while winning from
the Communist leadership what it denied to Chen Shui-
bian. Thus he will have three main challenges to confront,
each linked to the others: the economy, relations with
China, and national identity.
The economy
Ma has projected himself as the saviour of a failing econo-
my that needs treatment. His programme promises 6 per-
cent growth in 2008, unemployment below 3 percent by
2012, and a per capita GDP of US$30,000 by 2016. To
achieve these goals, he is counting on the swift opening up
of direct air links with China and a mass influx of tourists
from the mainland, the launch of 12 big infrastructure proj-
ects costing a total of US$130 billion (25 percent of nation-
al GDP), and the transformation of Taiwan into a regional
base for foreign multinationals investing in China.
Four years of negative publicity by the pro-Pan-Blue media
(that is, two thirds of all Taiwanese media) have finally con-
vinced a fair number of Taiwanese people that their econo-
my is in crisis. The fact is, as we shall show, that the eco-
nomic balance sheet from the Chen years is good, and the
continuous success of the high technology sectors has boost-
ed Taiwanese exports to a succession of new records. (18)
Even so, Taiwan faces two problems. The first is the eco-
nomic restructuring brought about by globalisation and the
relocation of businesses, to which all present-day developed
economies are subject and face similar difficulties. Like the
South Koreans, however, (19) the Taiwanese population tends
to forget the new barriers to growth presented by the coun-
try’s high level of development, and compares its growth fig-
ures to those of China or other developing countries such as
Vietnam or India, or even with the economies of entrepôt
cities and financial centres such as Hong Kong and
Singapore; this view generates mistaken assumptions about
Taiwan’s real performance. The second problem, linked to
the first, is the crucial issue of purchasing power and the
redistribution of national wealth towards the middle and
poorer classes, a problem that affects the whole of the
region. (20) An important argument in the KMT’s campaign
was to dwell on Taiwan’s growing social inequality. This
problem is indeed central to the impression of relative
decline shared by a section of the population, but it will not
be easy to solve. In any case, a comparison with other coun-
tries at the same economic level shows Taiwan’s position to
be quite good.
GDP growth during Chen’s time, from 2000 to 2007, aver-
aged 4.1 percent per year, (21) compared with 6.5 percent in
the 1990s and 8.2 percent in the 1980s. This is a classic fea-
ture of industrial and technological development: growth
rates decline as national wealth increases. Taking Chen’s
two terms separately, we see that from 2000 to 2003, aver-
age annual growth was 2.9 percent, including a recession in
17. Liang Wen-chieh, “The DPP Must Rethink its Strategy,” Taipei Times, 7 April 2008.
18. Cf. François Blanc, « Bilan économique des années Chen Shui-bian », La Lettre de
Taiwan, n° 144, April 2008, p. 2-7.
19. In respect of the economic situation as well as recent political developments, similari-
ties between Taiwan and South Korea are in fact quite numerous. Cf. for example
Philippe Pons, “Corée du Sud, nouvelle donne politique,” Le Monde, 29 February 2008.
20. Cf. International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook. Asia and Pacific, Chap.
IV, “Rising Inequality and Polarization in Asia,” September 2006.
21. The assessment of the Taiwanese economy in the following paragraphs is based on gov-
ernment statistics supplied by the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics (DGBAS) (cf. MacroEconomics Database, http://61.60.106.82/pxweb/
Dialog/statfile1L.asp?lang=1&strList=L); based also on Taiwan’s Economic Situation
and Outlook, Council for Economic Planning and Development, March 2008, and Taiwan
Statistical Data Book 2007, CEPD, Executive Yuan, R.O.C., Taiwan, June 2007.
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2001 (-2.2 percent) largely attributable to the bursting of the
world dot-com bubble and the subsequent American recession.
Between 2004 and 2007, growth averaged 5.2 percent, finish-
ing in 2007 with 5.7 percent, which is close to the rate of 5.8
percent achieved during Lee Teng-hui’s final term in 1996-99.
Looking at regional comparisons, it appears that over the
decade 1997-2007, Singapore grew at an average of 5.6 per-
cent and South Korea at 4.4 percent, as against Taiwan’s 4.5
percent. (22) Yet, in terms of per capita GDP, Taiwan grew
slightly faster than its rivals (3.96 percent annually, as against
3.55 percent for Singapore and 3.83 percent for South
Korea) because of their higher population growth. Over the
period 2004-2007, South Korea grew by 4.75 percent annu-
ally, again more slowly than Taiwan. (23) Although the KMT
claimed during its campaign that South Korea had overtaken
Taiwan -- with an annual per capita GDP of US$20,045 as
against Taiwan’s US$16,690 in 2007 -- this catching up was
mainly due to higher inflation and the rise of the South
Korean Won against the US dollar, contrasting with Taipei’s
low inflation and restrictive monetary policy. (24) If we look at
per capita GDP in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP),
Taiwan’s lead over South Korea is still substantial:
US$30,100 as against US$24,800 in 2007. (25) From this
angle, then, the economy bequeathed by the DPP to the
new Ma government looks extremely healthy.
Turning to employment levels, the unemployment rate in
Taiwan was 3.9 percent in 2006 and 2007. While that figure
is much to be envied in many developed countries, it is con-
sidered too high by a population that experienced full
employment until the 2001 recession. Unemployment subse-
quently shot up from 2.69 percent in 2000 to 4.57 percent in
2001, and on to a record 5.17 percent in 2002, falling grad-
ually since then. Yet, we should note at the same time a rise
in the percentage of the active population (sometimes a
forced choice) from 57.2 percent of those of working age in
2001 to 58.3 percent in 2007. That represents a million extra
people in the labour market in seven years, and as many jobs
created (they were 30,000 less unemployed people in 2007
compared with 2001). A glance back at the 1990s also
shows that the rise in unemployment predates Chen’s com-
ing to power. From 1992 to 1995, when unemployment aver-
aged 1.57 percent (1.87 percent between 1979 and 1995),
the rate jumped to 2.6 percent in 1996 and remained at an
average of 2.73 percent between 1996 and 1999. It was pre-
cisely at this time, economists believe, that the shift of
Taiwanese manufacturing to Southeast Asia and China at
the end of the 1980s began to have a strong negative impact
on employment and purchasing power in Taiwan. (26)
In terms of social inequality, a marked rise in the income gap
between rich and poor was apparent at the start of the 2000s,
reflecting the recession and the accelerating rate of industrial
migration into China, notably by Taiwan’s IT sector. (27) The
Gini coefficient reached a peak of 0.350 in 2001, falling to
0.339 in 2006. But the truth is that the coefficient had already
been rising steadily since 1980, from 0.277 to 0.326 by 2000,
and actually rose more precipitously between 1992 and 2000
(+ 0.024) than between 2000 and 2006 (+ 0.013). The
income gap between the richest 20 percent of households and
the poorest 20 percent also rose steadily from 4.17 in 1980 to
5.5 in 1999. After that it climbed to 6.39 in 2001 before
falling back to 6.01 in 2006. So, while the gap was at its worst
during the DPP’s period in office, the increase was part of a
long-term process that reached its peak during the 2001 reces-
sion and has since improved, although remaining higher than
1990s levels. These figures are relatively good in the interna-
tional context, reflecting a rather egalitarian society in compar-
ison with rising social inequality elsewhere in Asia, especially
South Korea. (28)
The main problem remains the stagnation of incomes and
especially of wages since 2000. Although the total value of
goods and services rose 47.8  percent from 2001 to 2006,
the average wage increased by only 7.1 percent. (29) Between
2000 and 2007, total wage growth was limited to 7.6 per-
cent, only 1.7 percent more than inflation during the same
period, while productivity jumped 48.7 percent. (30) The
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22. Hwan C. Lin, “Taiwan’s Economy is not Bad Off”, Taipei Times, 3 March 2008.
23. Cf. IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, March 2008.
24. Ibid.
25. Cf. Ibid. By comparison, annual GDP per capita in PPP (expressed in US dollars in 2007)
of the US was $45,800, UK $35,300, Germany $34,200, Japan $33,600, France
$33,200, and Spain $30,100. Figures for Hong Kong and Singapore respectively were
$42,000 and $49,700. China’s figure is $5,300. Expressing GDP per capita in PPP helps
to correct currency fluctuations and to compare the real cost of living in different coun-
tries.
26. CF T. J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and
Superconductivity,” in N. Tucker, Dangerous Straits. The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, op.
cit., pp. 93-130.
27. Cf. ibid., and Craig Meer, Jonathan Adams, “Specter of Inequality Haunts Taiwan,” Far
Eastern Economic Review, vol. 169, n° 10, December 2006, pp. 38-42.
28. Cf. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook. Asia andPacific, op. cit. Thus, while Taiwan’s Gini
coefficient is higher than that of Germany (0.283), France (0.327), and South Korea
(0.331), it is lower than that of Spain (0.347), Australia (0.352), and the UK (0.360), and
especially of the US (0.408), Singapore (0.485), Hong Kong (0.514), and China (0.469).
Cf. Ibid. for Asian countries. For the others, cf. “Inequality in Income or Expenditure /
Gini Index,” UNDP Human Development Report 2007/08.
29. Cf. DGBAS, http://www.stat.gov.tw/public/Data/843016151671.doc.
30. Cf. DGBAS MacroEconomics Database, op. cit, et F. Blanc, “Bilan économique des
années Chen Shui-bian,” op. cit. In 2007, the average monthly wage in industry and
services was NT$45,112. In 2000, it was NT$41,938, and in 1994 NT$33,689. There
was, however, a significant drop (about 16 hours) in the number of hours worked per
month between 1994 and 2007. 
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2001 recession, combined with lower – or even stagnant –
wage growth for a portion of the population (the upper class-
es remaining notably unscathed) has thus given the
Taiwanese a feeling of relative impoverishment, intensified
by the fall in the Taiwanese dollar against many other cur-
rencies, which was caused by the central bank’s decision to
maintain parity with the US dollar to support exports. (31)
Ma Ying-jeou’s biggest problem on the economic front,
therefore, will be to improve an economy that is doing well
but faces acute problems in terms of stagnation of middle
and lower class incomes, redistribution of national wealth,
and restructuring of the industry and services sectors. (32)
These questions were not really tackled during the electoral
campaign, so much of the population tends to believe that
the solution to these problems is faster GDP growth, to be
achieved in particular by greater economic interaction with
China. The fact is, however, that one of the main causes of
growing unemployment since the mid-1990s, especially
among unskilled workers, is the relocation of labour-intensive
industries to China and Southeast Asia. (33) Another factor is
members of the Taiwanese business community, known as
Taishang, who have migrated to the mainland and taken
their consumption with them; these are mainly entrepre-
neurs and white collar workers, qualified and well paid, who
comprise, with their families, more than a million people, or
5 percent of the Taiwanese population. Lastly, since the mid
1990s, the rise in capital income (finance and property) has
outstripped that of earned income, contributing to rising
social inequality while low tax revenue (13 percent of GDP)
limits redistributing of national wealth. (34)
Since the problems are not temporary but structural, the
KMT and Ma will find them no easier to solve than did the
DPP. Indeed, the promised closer relations with China will
intensify the migration of business, no longer affecting only
low technology -- that relocation was completed by the mid
1990s -- but high technology as well, particularly semi-con-
ductors, flat screens, and possibly Taiwan’s heavy industry.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that the agreement
on direct air links with China or increased numbers of
Chinese tourists (rising to 3,000-10,000 a day compared
with 1,000 now) will bring a real increase in growth and rev-
enue outside the sectors of air transport and tourism. Still
more problematic will be the opening up of Taiwan to
Chinese investors, particularly in commercial and residential
property, when access to house ownership is already increas-
ingly difficult for young families in Taipei, and signs of a real
estate bubble have already appeared. (35) Lastly, the tax cuts
announced by the new KMT government are likely to
endanger the balanced budget so hard won by the DPP
since 2006 (at a time when revenue from taxation is already
among the lowest in the industrialised countries), and may
encourage the government to resort to debt in order to
finance state expenditure. (36)
Perhaps more promising is the attempt to change Taiwan
into a regional financial centre for the research, develop-
ment, and logistics needed to take full advantage of China’s
growth. This project, which Vice-President Siew had
already proposed as Prime Minister under Lee Teng-hui
(1997-2000), now has better chances of success with the
improvement of Taiwan’s technical and professional capabil-
ities and the expected opening of direct links with China.
These same links should also allow the Taishang to send
profits back home, thus restoring some of their consumption
to Taiwan, along with that of foreign expatriates in China.
The gigantic new infrastructure programme proposed by Ma
should also, once its funding has been resolved, provide a
spur to public investment and supply much-needed jobs,
even though the toughest minimum-wage construction work
(at NT$17,000) attracts only immigrant workers from
Southeast Asia, as has been the case since the 1990s. It
remains to be seen how the new government will manage to
further develop the services sector to provide new jobs for
both unskilled labourers and professionals while boosting
incomes across the board.
Relations w ith  China
Relations with China constitute a further major challenge
for Ma Ying-jeou, at the political level in particular. The
KMT’s proposals for closer economic ties should win sup-
port from Beijing and from the Taiwanese people as long as
they benefit from them. As for the gradual establishment of
air links (passenger and cargo) and the opening to Chinese
tourists, the technical negotiations between Taipei and
Beijing were already settled in 2007 under the DPP. Ma
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31. The value of the Euro has thus increased more than 50 percent, from NT$30 in 2001 to
NT$48 in 2008.
32. Cf. Ting-I Tsai, “What to do about the Widening Income Gap,” Taiwan Business Topics,
37-2, February 2007.
33. Cf. C. Meer, J. Adams, “Specter of Inequality Haunts Taiwan,” op. cit.
34. Cf. Ting-I Tsai, “What to do about the Widening Income Gap,” op. cit.; Chan Huo-sheng,
Hsue Cheng-tai, “Exploring M-shaped Society and Policy Implications for Taiwan,” NPF
Research Report, National Policy Foundation, Taipei, 23 January 2008. 
35. Joyce Huang, “Real Estate Experts Warn of Potential Oversupply,” Taipei Times, 2 May
2008.
36. Cf. Jerry Lin, Kevin Chen, “KMT Facing Three Main Challenges, Economists Say,” Taipei
Times, 23 March 2008; F. Blanc, “Bilan économique des années Chen Shui-bian,” op. cit.
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should therefore be able to swiftly receive the political “gift”
that Beijing was denying to Chen with the start of direct
weekend charter flights promised for July 2008.
The basis of Ma’s China policy is the acceptance of the
“one China, different interpretations” (yizhong gebiao)
compromise (which already produced the 1992-3 technical
agreements between Taipei and Beijing) and of the concept
of “mutual non-denial” between the two capitals. (37) Yet, its
success depends almost entirely on China’s understanding
and goodwill. As the recent encounter between Vincent
Siew and Hu Jintao at the Boao Forum suggests, Beijing
does seem ready to play the game and to maintain a positive
cross-Strait dynamic, while remaining vague about its agree-
ment on the “double interpretation.” (38) Ma’s victory and the
failure of the referendums on Taiwan joining the UN are in
fact very good news for Beijing. But with Ma in power, the
Chinese Communist government also finds itself in a more
complex situation. For eight years, Beijing was easily able to
treat Chen as a villain, blaming him for poor cross-Strait rela-
tions while demanding his respect for a “one China” con-
cept that was unacceptable to the DPP administration and
relying on Washington to apply its Taiwan policy. Although
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has revised its aim of
rapid reunification, aiming instead to block Taiwan’s
progress towards independence, it has hardly moved on the
basic principle of recognising the ROC; nor has it proposed
any framework for political integration more considerate of
Taiwan’s wishes and realities than the “one country, two sys-
tems” formula.
Furthermore, contrary to what the present discourse of the
KMT and the CCP might suggest, the recent political ten-
sions between Taiwan and China long predate Chen’s acces-
sion to power; his policy towards China was essentially a
continuation of Lee’s. (39) In fact, even if the leaders of the
SEF and its Chinese counterpart, ARATS, managed to
meet in 1998 in Shanghai, official contacts between the two
capitals have almost been at a dead end ever since Lee’s
1995 visit to the US, followed by the Chinese missile tests
in Taiwanese territorial waters, all that at a time during
which the ruling KMT adhered to the so-called “1992 con-
sensus”. (40) Beijing will therefore now be obliged to demon-
strate that its own inflexibility is not blocking political rela-
tions with Taipei; it will have to propose measures that
answer Taiwanese expectations of being better represented
in international bodies and of an end to the diplomatic war
against their country.
In Ma Ying-jeou Beijing also comes up against a president
who is very attached to the ROC, its legitimacy, and its
history. Ma is one of the few politicians, even among
mainlanders, to keep alive the flame of the May Fourth
Movement, which he has celebrated every year in a pub-
lic statement. Even more fundamentally, any peace accord
between the two sides will be impossible until Beijing
acknowledges the fact that all Taiwanese people, the
KMT foremost among them, consider the ROC in
Taiwan to be a sovereign and independent state. Ma is
also concerned about democracy in China, repeatedly ask-
ing for an official re-evaluation of the Tiananmen events,
religious freedom in China and Tibet, and an end to the
repression of Falun Gong, attitudes that hardly endear
him to the CCP. (41)
Observers will be watching to see what Beijing can offer
Ma to maintain the interest and goodwill of the Taiwanese
towards China at a time when increasing operating costs
(labour and raw materials) are pushing many small and
medium-sized Taiwanese businesses to reconsider their
presence on the mainland. (42) Ma will need concrete
results, and not just symbolic progress, to prove the valid-
ity of his China policy. For Washington, Ma’s election is
also an opportunity for detente that Beijing should not
miss. (43) The first tests will be sorting out Taiwan’s mem-
bership in the WHO and other international organisa-
tions and groupings, and at the defence level, a withdraw-
al or reduction in the number of missiles targeting Taiwan.
On his side, Ma has nothing to gain from appearing to
cosy up too quickly to Beijing and to compromise with an
authoritarian and anti-democratic government. Indeed,
much of his presidency’s success will depend on his effec-
tive defence of the interests and sovereignty of Taiwan, in
full respect for the Taiwanese identity of which he has
declared himself guarantor. 
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37. Dimitri Bruyas, “Ma repeats ‘mutual non-denial’ policy,” The China Post, 24 March 2008.
38. Cf. William Foreman, “Taiwan VP-Elect Meets China’s Hu,” Associated Press, 12 April
2008; D. Brown, “Taiwan Voters Set a New Course,” op. cit.
39. Cf. Mikael Mattlin, “Same Content, Different Wrapping: Cross-Strait Policy Under DPP
Rule,” China Perspectives, n°56, November-December 2004, pp. 26-33.
40. Cf. Richard Bush, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Separatism,’” in N. Tucker, Dangerous Straits: The
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National  identity
Ma’s victory and his new Taiwanese identity are the best
proof that Chen Shui-bian’s two terms in office helped to
consolidate the Taiwanese national identity and the
Taiwanisation of society as a whole. (44) Ma’s victory is of sym-
bolic importance in that he is the first mainlander (waishen-
gren) to be democratically elected President of Taiwan by a
population that is 85 percent local (benshengren). It marks
the end of an epoch and of a policy based on the distinction
between benshengren and waishengren that was first institut-
ed with the arrival of Chiang Kai-shek’s troops on the island
in 1945, and engendered the political and economic segrega-
tion of the benshengren under dictatorship. Democratisation
brought a sociopolitical re-adjustment in favour of the ben-
shengren, a process crowned by the election of Chen to the
presidency. (45) The ever-growing support of the people for
Taiwanese identity, and for Taiwanese independence, is thus
in no way contradicted by the return to power of a
Taiwanised KMT; (46) rather, the election of Ma marks the
emergence at the highest state level of the “new Taiwanese
society” through democratisation. It marks, indeed, the suc-
cess of Lee Teng-hui’s policy of Taiwanising the Republic of
China and the KMT and of changing mainlanders into “new
Taiwanese” (xin taiwanren). (47)
Taiwan’s successful national self-affirmation and establish-
ment of identity since the 1990s has made these issues of
less pressing concern, allowing space for other preoccupa-
tions, economic ones in particular. Yet, Taiwanese national
identity remains at the heart of political debate. It is built on
very particular historical foundations going back to at least
1895, and should prove lasting even though in a constant
state of evolution. At the same time, the continuing tensions
between the island’s political development and its closer eco-
nomic relations with China have endowed its people with a
fervent attachment to the status quo of de jure and de facto
sovereignty and independence for Taiwan as the Republic of
China, peace on the ground with China, and protection
from the US. The majority of Taiwanese people, wishing to
preserve what they have and conscious of the Chinese mili-
tary threat, are ready to soft-pedal their national claims, put-
ting off any resolution of the question until a later date. (48)
However, as long as China remains undemocratic and has
not reached Taiwan’s level of prosperity, there is no chance
that the Taiwanese would favour political unification.
Indeed, Taiwanese society continues to evolve differently
from China’s. Whereas during the 1980s some people
expected that the effect of trade and capitalism would bring
the two societies together, they have actually moved further
apart as democracy has become established in Taiwan and
a new generation has succeeded the old. The massacre of
28 February 1947 and the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 no
longer resonate much among many young people; this is
even more true of the mainlanders’ Chinese past and the
Qing Empire. More than half of today’s population was
born after 1970 and came (or will come) to political maturi-
ty in a democratic and Taiwanised environment. Few things
connect them to Chinese society, whether at the political,
social, or cultural levels, or in terms of mentality.
Furthermore, despite the naive aspirations of some, close
economic and commercial links between two countries have
never of themselves created a common national identity, as
attested by the case of Canada and the US (although
English-speaking Canada is united with its neighbour by lan-
guage and Anglo-Saxon culture). Admittedly, the growth in
the numbers of Taiwanese citizens living in China has
redoubled contacts between the two peoples, but that has
not necessarily brought the Taiwanese closer to the Chinese
or made them stakeholders in the same community. If any-
thing, closer contact has made Taiwanese more aware of the
differences between the two societies: living habits, educa-
tion and behaviour, treatment of others, openness to the out-
side world, appreciation for foreign cultures and countries
(for the US and Japan in particular), experience and knowl-
edge of Chinese culture (religion, art of living, and so on),
and, above all, political freedom and democracy, not to men-
tion the respect for Taiwanese culture, the respect for the
rule of law and for an impartial legal environment, and
Taiwan’s social security and health system. Often, the
Taiwanese appreciate China mainly as consumers: their
approach is financial, careerist, or touristic, with the excep-
tion of a small minority attached to Greater Chinese nation-
alism. Many supporters of the Pan-Blues, including the
mainlanders, prefer thus to live in and come home to Taiwan
while supporting new economic links and the lowering of
tension across the Strait.
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Understanding all this, Ma tuned his message to the wishes
of the Taiwanese people, and they rewarded him with their
votes. Now he will have to continue representing the inter-
ests of the majority of the Taiwanese who wish to maintain
the status quo and not to be dragged by the KMT’s radical
unificationists into excessive concessions towards Beijing.
Democratisation has been an essential element in forming
the Taiwanese national identity and its domestic and foreign
policies ever since the 1990s. It has enabled the Taiwanese
to support Lee Teng-hui’s policy of national self-affirmation
abroad, and then to oppose Chen Shui-bian’s too-rapid pur-
suit of independence; now it will be the means of controlling
the new KMT government’s policy on relations with China.Conclusion
The 2008 elections marked the end of the Chen Shui-bian
era and ushered in the new Ma era. They also marked the
end or at least the decline of ethnic politics in favour of a
wider and more solid policy of national identity. Taiwan, a
model of democracy for the region and the world, has
demonstrated once again that democratic values and human
rights are entirely compatible with Chinese or Asian culture.
Numerous issues now await Ma’s attention, most particular-
ly the national “reconciliation” that people are hoping for
after years of ideological tension. His choice of a former
TSU deputy close to Lee Teng-hui as the new Minister for
Mainland Affairs is a first gesture towards the Pro-
Independence camp. (49) However more will be needed to
ease the Greens’ anxiety about the real depth of Ma’s new
Taiwanese identity in regard to his known Chinese national-
ism.
For the rest, the incoming governmental team is composed
mainly of old KMT technocrats (with past experience of the
country’s administrative affairs during the 1990s) and aca-
demics. It projects itself also as a government of experts in
the service of the economy and the people. 
The Taiwanese people are thirsty for international status and
recognition and will soon demand from the new administra-
tion practical results in this area. But if Ma manages to keep
his promises and to improve the situation of the middle class
while respecting Taiwanese identity, he might become a
very popular president, and barring accidents, may position
himself favourably for re-election in 2012. •
• Translated by Philip Liddell
4. The New Taiwanese Government
49. Cf. Flora Wang, “Liu names major Cabinet posts,” Taipei Times, 29 April 2008.
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